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A Philosophical-Anthropological Approach
Mit der allmählichen Überwindung der Absolutsetzung des eigenen 
Volkstums, das gleichwohl seinen Absolutheitsaspekt hat – in der Sphäre 
seines sich je schon Erschlossenseins und Verstandenhabens – zivilisiert sich 
die Politik. Die Kampfmittel werden andere und die Ziele werden relativer. 
Aber der Kampf verliert weder seine Schärfe noch sein Gewicht für die letzten 
menschlichen Entscheidungen.
 Helmuth Plessner (1981, p. 233) 
Introduction
Human rights are in for some serious discussion in the decades to come.1 
In Pablo Gilabert’s (2008) terms, much of the theoretical discussion on the 
subject has attempted to supply either ‘humanist’ or ‘political’ justifications 
of human rights. It seems that reliance on one of these in isolation creates 
a problem. When we cite only humanist justifications, we are missing that 
human rights are objects of political contestation; at the same time, they 
seem to apply to human beings in virtue of their humanity. Many of the 
debates about human rights concern the question which of these captures 
the essence of human rights. For instance, the question how the individual 
subject of rights relates to more collective-oriented political systems is cen-
tral to many discussions about human rights in Asia (Hansen, 1994). I will 
attempt to explain how these aspects of human rights interrelate, using a 
method that follows Joachim Fischer’s paradigm of philosophical anthro-
pology (Fischer, 2009).
Since an important part of the conflict concerns the interpretation 
of rights, I first pose the question what it means to interpret some-
thing. Interpretation is a response to human finitude, in the sense 
that it allows us to act even when we do not have a God’s-eye point of 
view. Spatial finitude requires a particular kind of interpretation, most 
centrally a conception of what culture is. I draw on the work of ‘spa-
tial finitude theorist’ Helmuth Plessner and philosopher of culture 
Wolfgang Welsch in order to show that an ‘excentric’ conception of 
culture is needed. But how does this connect to human rights? The 
work of Jacques Rancière offers a philosophical account of human 
rights that is compatible with my account of excentric culture. Having 
explored that account, I show that the contemporary practice of human 
rights can be explained in terms of Rancière’s work. Circling back to 
Plessner’s anthropology will help us to survey the landscape thus laid out, in 
particular the connection between spatial finitude and the conceptions of 
culture and human rights.
We need to come to grips with cultural difference, while not 
setting cultures apart in a way that foregoes future dialogue. The task 
I have set myself is hermeneutical in two ways: I argue for a particular 
interpretation of cultural difference (§1), and I provide a philosophical 
interpretation of human rights that is compatible with it (§2).
§1 Cultural difference re-interpreted
The contested justification of human rights
An important question within the theoretical discussion about human 
rights is under what conditions they can be said to hold. We can roughly 
distinguish between the ‘humanist’ and the ‘political’ perspectives. The 
difference between these two approaches is their proposed mode of 
justification, in particular their take on the relation between human 
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rights and institutions. According to the humanist conception, “human 
rights are pre-institutional claims that individuals have against all other 
individuals in virtue of interests characteristic of their common human-
ity”, whereas the political conception sees them as “claims that individuals 
have against certain institutional structures, in particular modern states, 
in virtue of interests they have in contexts that include them” (Gilabert, 
2008, p. 440). Pablo Gilabert has argued that the two conceptions are best 
viewed as complementary: we need both to “make good normative sense 
of the contemporary practice of human rights” (ibid.), because human 
rights need to be understood as a combination of abstract rights, which 
are compatible with a humanist account of the subject of human rights, 
and specific rights, which have to be interpreted, weighed and assessed in 
particular (political) contexts. But both the scope and content of human 
rights are being actively contested. This leads us to a set of fundamental 
interpretative questions. Do human rights require us to override cultural 
and religious traditions, for instance? The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 
offers a typical answer to this question:
[Human rights] must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds. (cited by Hansen, 1995, p. 399)2 
Seemingly innocuous statements along these lines may function as a 
subordination of abstract rights to the sovereignty of particular 
governments (Peerenboom, 2005, p. 82; Hansen, 1994, p. 340). From the 
standpoint of abstract rights, it is easy to object that abstract rights should 
entail individual liberties independent of legal or historical contexts. As a 
criticism of that objection, one nation’s commentary on another’s supposed 
failure to observe human rights counts as meddling in national politics 
– this has been China’s position (Peerenboom, 2005). This, in turn, can 
naturally be countered by claiming that sovereignty itself should be bound 
to the constraints set by the human rights framework. Rehashing the 
disagreement in this way shows how humanist and political aspects 
of human rights can be opposed to one another. However, as Gilabert 
noted, we need to take both aspects on board – somehow. But it seems 
impossible to take any position without pre-empting the interpretative 
conflict: criticizing one position from the opposite point of view amounts 
to no more than a circular argument.
Consider a parallel quandary in the context of individual human 
affairs. Are human beings natural or cultural creatures? In Fischer’s (2009) 
description, pure naturalists argue that every aspect of human 
existence can be explained with reference to nature. On the other end of the 
spectrum, pure culturalists argue that the very discourse of naturalism 
should be understood as a cultural phenomenon – as one discourse among 
many others, as much a construction as anything else (see ibid.). The 
paradigm of philosophical anthropology has the virtue of being a third 
way: it takes into account the Sonderstellung of the human organism 
while simultaneously representing man as man-in-nature (ibid.).
Human rights, too, stand in need of a place in between societal 
convention (‘political’) and absolute status (‘humanist’), as this would 
fulfill Gilabert’s requirement of combining the political and humanist 
conceptions of their justification. I therefore propose to analyze human 
rights from within the framework of philosophical anthropology.
The role of interpretation
Conflicts of interpretation partly explain the existing disagreement on 
the subject of human rights. Because of the nature of abstract rights, 
agreement with respect to human rights will likewise arise out of a 
common interpretation. In both cases, proper understanding is not imme-
diately given, but needs to be supplied by interpretation. But why would 
that be the case?
Hermeneutik ist die Kunst, aus einem Text herauszukriegen, was nicht 
drinsteht: wozu – wenn man doch den Text hat – brauchte man sie 
sonst? Aber braucht man sie überhaupt? Was ist das eigentlich, was man 
da braucht, wenn man das Interpretieren, die Hermeneutik, braucht: 
wie muß, wie kann die Hermeneutik selber verstanden und interpretiert 
werden? (Marquard, 1981, p. 117)3 
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Odo Marquard here asks a question that is both fundamental and urgent, 
especially if we expand the scope of hermeneutics from texts to foreign 
cultures. What does it mean to invoke an ‘art’ or ‘ability’ [Kunst] that is 
not contained within the culture to be interpreted? Marquard answers his 
own question in two steps. Firstly, he refers to Collingwood’s and Gad-
amer’s claims that the understanding of a given expression arises when 
we know the question to which it is an answer (Gadamer, 2010, p. 
375). Secondly, an interpretative act positively requires partial under-
standing. It has to find its proper place between the extremes of total 
knowledge and total ignorance. In the words of Wilhelm Dilthey:
Die Auslegung wäre unmöglich, wenn die Lebensäusserungen 
gänzlich fremd wären. Sie wäre unnötig, wenn in ihr nichts fremd 
wäre. Zwischen diese beide äussersten Gegensätzen liegt sie also. 
(cited by Marquard, 1981, p. 146)4 
Marquard generalizes this situation of partial understanding to the 
quintessentially human condition of finitude, nonetheless coupled 
with the necessity to act (ibid.). The answer to Marquard’s question, 
then, is as follows: hermeneutics is a response to human finitude under 
conditions where we have to act. Interpreting across cultures poses a 
specific variant of this problem. Marquard’s own discussion is limited 
to finitude in the temporal sense, while he also mentions the idea of 
spatial finitude (ibid., p. 120). Posing the question how humanist and 
political justifications of human rights relate to each other requires us 
to think about the meaning of cultural difference. This first requires a 
conception of what culture is, which in turn poses the question how 
one culture relates to another. As I hope to show, intercultural relations 
can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of spatial finitude.
Spatial finitude has long been a central topic in philosophical 
anthropology. Helmuth Plessner describes the multi-layered relations 
an organism [Lebewesen] can enter into in terms of its ‘positionality’. 
Plessner thinks of the anthropological reality of having borders as “the 
constitutive principle for all organic organization” (ihre Realsetzung 
[bildet] das Konstitutionsprinzip für alle organische Formung; Plessner, 
2004, p. 35). Positionality describes “the form of [the organism’s] being 
posed in opposition to its environment” (die Form seiner Gestelltheit gegen 
das Umfeld; ibid., p. 10). By means of this concept, Plessner is able to 
emphasize both the continuity and the discontinuity between non-
human and human life. According to Plessner, human organisms are 
different from animals and plants in that they do not only relate to 
their surroundings, but also to their own ‘center’. That is the core of 
man’s excentric positionality.
Der Mensch, in seine Grenze gesetzt, lebt über sie hinaus, die ihn, 
das lebendige Ding, begrenzt. Er lebt und erlebt nicht nur, sondern 
er erlebt sein Erleben. (ibid.)5 
As an expression of the paradigm of philosophical anthropology, this 
is not only a dispassionate analysis of consciousness of self and its 
rootedness in biology. Plessner also connects the framework of 
positionality to themes relevant to technology, religion and culture more 
generally, without reducing culture to nature or vice versa. According to 
Plessner, excentric positionality entails three anthropological laws, which 
will be important to us at a later stage (ibid., pp. 15-64): 
(1) Humanity can only be realized by non-human means;
(2) No human has unmediated access to himself;
(3) While humans will always seek to overcome their excentric  
  positionality, such attempts are doomed to fail.
While Plessner is mainly interested in biology, his analysis can be 
transposed to matters of culture as well. His work allows us to 
distinguish between various cultural possibilities with regard to 
‘forms of being posed’ in relation to other cultures. As in Plessner’s 
biology, external relations determine the kind of cultural ‘organism’ 
we are describing – itself very much a finite creature. The relevance 
of applying the notion of positionality in a cultural context becomes 
especially clear if we realize, with Wolfgang Welsch, that concepts 
of culture are not just descriptive, but also operative, in the sense 
that “our understanding of culture is an active factor in our 
cultural life” (Welsch, 1999, p. 291). In other words, how we define culture 
helps to shape the culture we live in.
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So far, we have seen that an interpretation is a response to 
finitude under conditions where action is called for. More specifically, 
interpretation in the context of human rights responds to spatial 
finitude, asking us to rethink the concept of culture. Plessner’s philo-
sophical anthropology provides a ‘third way’ between reductions to 
nature and culture, so that his concept of positionality is a promising 
way of thinking about human finitude.
Welsch’s concepts of culture
The central question to be asked at this point is how cultures 
themselves should be understood: as we will see, this will deter-
mine their interrelation, or, in Plessner’s terms, their ‘form of being 
posed’. Welsch attributes what he calls the traditional concept of cul-
ture to Johann Gottfried von Herder, who had defined culture in 
terms of social homogenization, ethnic consolidation and intercultural 
delimitation (ibid., pp. 194-195).
Let us try to apply this idea. If we think of cultural 
difference in Herder’s way, we are left to conclude that other cultures are 
irreconcilably alien. Consider the cultural ‘divide’ between China and the 
West. Herder’s conception firstly makes it necessary for us to think of the 
Chinese people and its individuals as being governed by a kind of mould, 
“making every act and every object an unmistakable instance of precisely 
this culture” (ibid., Welsch’s emphasis). Secondly, it promises that there is 
an ethnic component to the culture: it is ‘folk-bound’, so that Westerners 
are always part of the Western culture, and Chinese of the Chinese (ibid.). 
Thirdly and finally, “[e]very culture is, as the culture of one folk, to be 
distinguished and so remains separated from other folks’ cultures” (ibid.).
As Welsch signals, “[w]hat is called for today is a departure from 
this concept and to think of cultures beyond the contraposition of 
ownness and foreignness” (ibid., pp. 195-196). The challenges of today’s 
intercultural affairs cannot be met by a conception of culture that 
represents cultures as being “constituted in the form of islands or 
[autonomous] spheres” (ibid., p. 198). As a consequence of that 
conception, conflicts concerning human rights could then only be 
addressed by policies of actively ignoring or even actively repressing the 
other party: an attitude of dynamic engagement is out of the question 
(Angle, 2002, pp. 57-65). This ‘form of being posed’ towards other 
cultures is clearly not something to be encouraged from a normative 
point of view, and it is not clear if it is descriptively accurate.
In reality, as Welsch points out, cultures are not homogene-
ous and separate in the way required by the Herderian conception of 
culture. “Cultural conditions today are largely characterized by mixes 
and permeations”, to which the category of “transculturality” can be 
applied “insofar as this form of culture passes through classical cultural 
boundaries” (Welsch, 1999, p. 198). Transculturality implies a high 
degree of internal differentiation and a new kind of relation ‘between 
cultures’. For instance, journalism and academic culture are not rooted 
in local traditions: rather, what it means to be a journalist or an 
academic is determined by European or even global criteria, because 
the relevant community is not determined by territorial or linguistic 
sameness, but by a self-determining culture that responds to a large 
amount of differing affiliations (ibid., p. 199). Because of this fact, 
supposedly fundamentally different cultures face the same basic 
problems today, although they sometimes surface in different ways – 
Welsch explicitly refers to “the human rights debate” as being “an active 
factor across the board culturally” (ibid.). Certainly, this does not mean 
that there is only sameness – it just means that foreignness is no longer 
geographically determined.
To Welsch, this warrants the claim that for every culture, “all 
other cultures have (…) come to be inner-content or satellites” 
(Welsch, 1999, p. 199). Economic dependencies, migrant populations 
and the exchange of information are three factors in this process of 
dissemination, but many more could be named. It is clear that even 
if there were once grounds in support of drawing an absolute line 
around state’s borders and declaring those lines to be devices of cultural 
containment, this is now no longer the case. The national domains of 
China, the European countries and the United States of America are 
not home to isolated processes. The concept of globalization captures 
an undeniable reality about present international affairs. We may hazard 
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a general statement to the effect that human history of Homo sapiens 
is characterized by “an increasingly accelerated pace of globalization”, 
but this development has exploded out of all proportion over the last 
decade, so that “globalization has become a decisive phenomenon in the 
life of almost every world citizen” (De Mul, 2011, p. 63).
Henceforward there is no longer anything absolutely foreign (…) or 
exclusively ‘own’ (…). Today in a culture’s internal relations – among its 
different ways of life – there exists as much foreignness as in its external 
relations with other cultures. (Welsch, 1999, p. 199, my italics)
Welsch himself is adamant that the traditional conception of culture is 
descriptively false and that only an analysis of transculturality can do 
justice to the complex state of international affairs. But to many, this does 
not seem convincing (cf. Peerenboom, 2005, p. 72). Of course, this does 
not make cultural difference go away. Welsch’s concepts are themselves 
strategies for dealing with cultural difference. Still, it seems unclear what 
would follow from his proposed strategy. How to solve the interpretative 
conflict that is central to human rights? More fundamentally, it seems 
that the very meaning of politics is to insist on the worth of separate 
communities of value or peoples (Plessner, 1981, p. 233). On a purely 
human level, every political subject exists as a “contingent rupture”, 
unable to speculate in a truly pure and abstract fashion; on the level of 
political philosophy, “history [itself ] has conquered the absolutism of plans 
[thought to be] definitive for history” (ibid., p. 234; p. 233). Paraphra- 
sing Plessner, the plurality and particularity of cultures is of a fundamental 
nature, and the idea that cultural difference is necessarily part of cultural 
life follows from this.
The promise of excentric culture
To recapitulate, interpretation in the context of human rights offers a 
response to spatial finitude on the cultural level. For example, because 
Chinese culture is not familiar to us, interpretation is required if 
we are to relate meaningfully to it. Welsch has fielded two possible 
“interpretative perspectives” (cf. Honneth, 2000, p. 267).6 If we would 
consider the Chinese case from the point of view of the Herderian 
conception of culture, there would be no point in trying to resolve 
the conflict: cultures  are simply bound to clash with one another. By 
contrast, the transcultural approach does allow for communication 
between cultures, because it abolishes the opposing realms of the ‘own’ 
and the ‘foreign’. However, the experience of cultural otherness remains, 
including the seemingly fundamental disagreement about human rights. 
The transcultural  approach does not offer a satisfying answer to that 
experience, which should not simply be discarded.
If we are to frame both the faults of the Herderian concept, the 
contrast between ‘centric’ and ‘excentric’ is a more promising starting 
point. These concepts were already introduced during our discussion 
of spatial finitude. In Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, the term 
‘centric’ is used to describe the organization of animal life, and indeed, 
part of the organization of human life. What is centric distinguishes 
itself from less complex forms of life by relating to its own border: it is 
aware of its place within the world. While the animal lives ‘as a center’, 
it does not experience its own ‘being’ as an object: that distance with 
respect to its own center is reserved for the excentric positionality that 
characterizes humankind (“Die Schranke der tierischen Organisation liegt 
darin, daß dem Individuum sein selber Sein verborgen ist (…) [e]s bildet 
ein Sich, aber es erlebt nicht – sich”, Plessner, 2004, pp. 9-10).
The Herderian culture has the centric feature of being unable to 
reflect on itself. A centric culture negates Plessner’s three anthropological 
laws: a centric culture (1) is complete in and of itself, (2) has unmedi-
ated access to itself, and (3) founds its own utopia. Any centric culture 
can be described as politically dangerous, precisely because other cul-
tures can only appear to the former as irreconcilably alien. I have now 
repeated Welsch’s observation, but another framework informs it: for 
that reason, I will also propose a different solution.
Like human positionality in Plessner’s anthropology, excentric 
culture is layered: on the one hand, there is a core of common humanity; 
on the other, there are additional ‘layers’ that potentially obscure mutual 
understanding.7  We are all in a position to understand the predicament 
of our fellow human beings in certain respects: for instance, we aim 
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to be recognized by others and we worry about our impending deaths. 
However, there are also characteristics that tie us to specific groups, or 
even individual points of view. There are cultures whose norms I can 
only struggle to understand. To say this is to claim that the experience 
of otherness is no longer absolute, as it was in the Herderian concept of 
culture, but still captures an element of our experience that should not 
be ignored. A culture does have an identity, in the sense that it is recog-
nizable as separate from others, but that is not all it is – in a sense that 
Plessner can help us grasp.
If we interpret culture as an excentric phenomenon, the op- 
position between cultures is not the result of a locally defined 
otherness that defies interpretation; nor is it a case of ‘mere diversity’. 
We understand each other sufficiently for interpretation to be possible, 
but not enough for it to be superfluous. The question that remains to be 
answered is whether there is a way of interpreting human rights that can 
incorporate the excentric concept of culture. What does the excentric 
conception of culture require of human rights?
§2 Excentricity and Human Rights
Human rights and dissensus
The reflexive nature of excentric culture reveals that the subject of human 
rights cannot be purely centric. For that reason, the ‘humanist’ and 
‘political’ justifications of human rights both fall short. What the two 
have in common is that they entail a non-reflexive foundation of human 
rights. If human rights are only justified politically, we only have to 
consider human rights law; if they are only justified humanistically, then a 
determinate set of rights exists that apply to us in virtue of being 
human. On both versions, once we have established what human rights 
demand of us, that would be the final word. We have already seen Pablo 
Gilabert assert that we need both in order to make sense of human 
rights. Now we also know why that is the case: absolute focus on either 
justification forecloses excentric positionality on the cultural level. 
In order to be compatible with the excentric conception of culture, we 
need to assume a reflexive subject of human rights.
According to Jacques Rancière, human rights are meaningful insofar 
as they are political instruments of dissensus. Understood in that way, a 
human right is “a division inserted in a ‘common sense’: a dispute over 
what is given and about the frame with which we see something as given” 
(Rancière, 2010, p. 69). The women of the French Revolution could not 
be heard by the administrators, because women were not seen as the 
bearers of political subjectivity: and political subjectivity resides precisely 
in acting as a bearer of rights. In this way, two worlds are combined. The 
apolitical world of the feminine is suddenly seen to be indistinct from 
the world of the political. Rancière’s final insight is that there is no truly 
separate political sphere. Instead, we should think of it in terms of a 
division. On the one hand, there is the police or the elements of 
society that are undeniably a part of it (and help keep the social 
mechanisms as they are). On the other hand, there is the supplement 
of society, consisting of ‘the part of those without part’ (those who are 
excluded from political participation). True politics is always the struggle 
against the police. Even if a particular struggle succeeds, this development 
will repeat itself. Once members of a formerly excluded group have 
“acted as subjects that did not have the rights they had and that had the 
rights they had not” (ibid.). The group’s victory consists in taking part in 
society for the first time. The newly created society, however, will continue 
to exclude other minority groups. Compare the way a cultural reference 
that symbolizes resistance against capitalism, say a cap bearing the 
likeness of the communist Che Guevara, itself becomes part of capitalist 
circulation. There are always new battles to be fought. Remark that 
those battles will always be fought in terms of uniting separate worlds. 
Arguably, this is precisely what interpretation is about: consider that 
the etymological root of the word ‘hermeneutics’ is ‘Hermes’, the Greek 
God who connected the human world with the divine.
This is not an accidental commonality. Recall Rancière’s insis-
tence on the importance of the dispute about what is given, and on the 
frames with which we determine what is given. Recall that according 
to Rancière, human rights are a division inserted in a common sense 
or a unification of separate worlds (Rancière, 2010, p. 69). In a sense, 
human rights are themselves interpretations, with the power to change 
the world.
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Because of the essentially polemical nature of politics, it is 
impossible to say that human rights have a fixed subject. “Not only is 
there no [universal] man of the Rights of Man, there is no need for one. 
The strength of those rights lies in the back-and-forth movement between 
the initial inscription of the right and the dissensual stage on which it is 
put to the test” (ibid., p. 71). This is the inner logic of rights: the initial 
description or declaration enters into ever-new situations and thus 
requires an ever-new subject.
This approach to human rights presupposes equality. But this is not 
a metaphysical, ‘natural’ or even ‘humanist’ kind of equality: according 
to Rancière, equality is rather a political presupposition, in his specific 
sense.8 In this way, a follower of Rancière can avoid picking sides in the 
debate over what we have called ‘humanist’ and ‘political’ conceptions of 
human rights, because Rancière’s conception simply avoids the dilemma. 
This may seem to come at a price: Rancière’s political philosophy is often 
seen as radical and is not a mainstream position in the theoretical debate 
about human rights. But I argue that it is possible to combine Rancière’s 
analysis of human rights with their contemporary practice. If that argument 
succeeds, the ‘third-way’ interpretation of human rights has been secured.
Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein…
The idea to be developed here is that human rights are tools that 
lend themselves to advancing the struggles of particular groups or 
individuals, without simultaneously being a tool of the police. Of course, 
much of the criticism that has been leveled against human rights, not 
only from Asia, but also from sources drawing on Islam and Western 
postmodernism, has taken this more politicized view of human rights as 
parts of Western imperialism (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 102). It seems adequate 
to suppose that “the substance of these rights (…) will always be contested 
and interpreted”, but that does not mean that human rights cannot be 
useful instruments for drawing attention to rights abuses all over the world 
(Appiah, 2005, p. 264). It is the on-going discussion about human rights 
itself that is essential to human rights. Taking that perspective can help 
us to explain why the practice of human rights need not reek of Western 
imperialism at all. In Pakistan, for instance, human rights are being 
claimed not by external powers seeking to discredit or destabilize national 
sovereignty, but by women who have come to think of themselves as 
oppressed by their tradition (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 332). 
Moreover, ‘rights talk’ is not only targeted at non-Western countries. 
In fact, some of the most pressing human rights concerns of today are 
articulated in response to acts of Western governments. Think, for 
instance, of the continued international upheaval surrounding Guanta-
namo Bay. Such occurrences are no incidents. 
Whenever an asylum seeker is deported behind closed doors at an 
airport, whenever a ship carrying refugees capsizes on the crossing 
from Libya to the Italian island of Lampedusa, whenever a shot is 
fired at the border fence between the United States and Mexico, 
we, the citizens of the West, confront one more troubling question. 
(Habermas, 2010, p. 476)9  
One of the important theoretical lessons to be drawn from the 
contraposition of human rights and Western practices is that the language 
of rights has a way of rebounding on the ones who formulated it, in a way 
that runs parallel to Rancière’s description of true politics and the ‘inner 
logic’ of rights. For the initial inscription of human rights, which was 
perhaps intended to secure the rights of Western elites or some other 
specific group, is not the end of the story. Human rights are always 
in the process of cutting through such boundaries, precisely because of 
their universal nature. Not that there are no differences between the 
rights claimed in different contexts: they start with the same set of 
(mostly abstract) rights and develop into more specific prescriptions as 
these abstract rights are applied to specific situations – which is to say, 
interpreted in specific ways. Human rights have ‘gone global by going 
local’: the various interpretations are going to reflect the specificity of 
the relevant contexts.
The back-and-forth between the ‘initial inscription’ and contempo-
rary situations is not a new phenomenon, but can be witnessed in the 
1948 drafts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and perhaps 
much earlier.10 
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The international rights revolution was not led by states that already 
practiced what they preached. America and the European nations had 
not completed the juridical emancipation of their own citizens or subject 
peoples. Indeed, many of the states that contributed to the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration saw no apparent contradiction between endorsing 
international norms abroad and continuing oppression at home. They 
thought that the Universal Declaration would remain a pious set of clichés 
more practiced in the breach than in the observance. Yet once articulated as 
international norms, rights language ignited both the colonial revolutions 
abroad and the civil rights revolution at home. (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 289)
While human rights can certainly be used for political gain,11 it does 
not seem persuasive in light of the above that they are only ‘political’ 
in nature. They are more than the rhetorical devices of the West or any 
other party, if only because their use as rhetorical devices has constraining 
consequences – they have a very real effect on the world of international 
relations.
Even if every political spokesperson of human rights is a partisan, 
resolved to further the cause of one group at the cost of another, the 
language of rights is invoked. It is important to add that because of the 
‘enactive’ nature of the rights concerned, the dialogue cannot be evaded: 
for example, once Olympe de Gouges enacted her right as a female 
French revolutionary, the society in which she lived was involved in the 
dialogue as a direct result. Phrases like ‘language of rights’ should thus 
not be seen in propositional terms. Rights are not always manifested in 
documents: sometimes they are claimed on the level of action. What is 
really at stake is the unification of two separate worlds, to use Rancière’s 
hermeneutical phrase.
Such enaction, as we have seen, forces certain effects upon its users: 
human rights are a constraining framework. Human rights would never 
have seemed as promising to so many political actors if it did not enable 
them to advance their own aims. But, crucially, they can do so only if 
they pay equal attention to the rights of others.
The role of moral universalism is not to take activists out of politics, 
but to get activists to discipline their partiality – their conviction that 
one side is right – with an equal commitment to the rights of the other 
side (…).  (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 292)
[As a result], [h]uman rights [are] universal not as a vernacular of 
cultural prescription but as a language of moral empowerment. [Their] 
role is not in defining the content of culture but in trying to enfranchise 
all agents so that they can freely shape that content. (ibid. p. 334)
From this, it follows that even if conflict is essential to human rights 
(we are all activists), then the human rights framework has the means to 
regulate itself (rights talk constrains). So what are the constraints that the 
use of the human rights framework itself imposes on us? This answer, too, 
can be derived from what has already been said. Firstly, any particular 
content can be argued for or against, but, secondly, it can never be insisted 
on without the assent of those that are directly involved in the culture. 
In other words, no culture can claim values on behalf of another party, as 
that would skew the discussion: and the discussion is open with respect 
to its content, because it does not ‘discriminate’. Thirdly and finally, the 
discussion has to be animated by the presupposition of moral equality 
for all parties, in advance of political discussion. Equality as a condition 
for the contestation of rights is thus the element of humanist justifica-
tion that is saved. This form of equality was Rancière’s presupposition, of 
course, and its point is clear: to avoid arbitrary preferences for particular 
values at the cost of others.
We began with the insight that hermeneutics is an answer to human 
finitude, which cannot be definitively overcome. Interpretation is, in the 
words of Wilhelm Dilthey, eine unendliche Aufgabe (see also Plessner, 
1981, p. 185). Working out the implications of human rights and inter-
preting particular cultural differences both require an infinite life but – 
vita brevis – humans are bound to a limited range of perspectives, as we 
have already seen from Plessner’s remark. What is human remains bound to 
time and place, much like Rancière’s political subject. That is not to say that 
interpretation is fruitless. It is precisely the experience of finitude that 
calls upon our interpretative faculty, because we have to act within the 
constraints that we were born into.
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Spatial finitude, human rights and hermeneutics
We are now in a position to consider what our discussion about rights 
implies for our understanding of the problem posed in this second part: 
how can the practice of human rights be connected to spatial finitude? 
Recall that the problem of spatial finitude received perhaps its most 
decisive treatment in the work of Helmuth Plessner. Making use of 
Plessner’s anthropology once more will serve to invigorate the central 
notions of our present investigation.
This anthropological analysis confirms the dilution of the own and 
the foreign on another level. According to Plessner, excentric positionality 
entails three anthropological laws (see Plessner, 2004, pp. 15-64): firstly, 
that humanity can only exist by artificial, that is to say, by non-biological and 
in that sense non-human means; secondly, that we do not have unmediated 
access to ourselves because this artificial addition has a certain momentum 
of its own. This was recognized by Welsch’s transcultural approach: our 
own culture is determined, in part, by how we relate to what is foreign, 
and vice versa. The third and final anthropological law concerns humanity’s 
search to overcome its decentered relation with respect to itself. Rancière’s 
polemic against the political equalization of society with the police, which 
foregoes the element of society that differentiates society from itself, can be 
seen as a quest against the anthropological need to search out the “utopian 
standpoint”, as Plessner calls it (ibid., pp. 60-64). Another way to put this 
is that human rights, which I have classed earlier as interpretations of what 
is given, oppose a tendency that is pervasive in man, namely his drive to be 
identical with himself. The utopian standpoint, which seeks to eliminate 
the self-distancing tendencies characteristic of excentric positionality, is 
simultaneously the attempt to relieve man of reflexivity. Human rights, at 
least as I interpreted them in this essay, are a reflection of the non-reality 
of the utopian standpoint. Life is short, our reach is limited and we must 
act. We are confronted not only with our temporal finitude, but also with 
our spatial finitude: human rights are interpretative perspectives that allow 
us to compensate the latter. While human rights may begin as attempts to 
secure our own rights, their language (‘inner logic’) constrains us to respect 
the rights of others as well. Their ideal limit would force us to be truly 
‘outside of oneself ’, in Plessner’s sense.
While Plessner’s utopian standpoint cannot be attained, the same 
is true of the equally utopian standpoint of fully realized human rights. 
Rancière theorizes that there will always be excluded groups, but still 
stresses the importance of politics. Hermeneutics teaches us a related 
lesson, which speaks both of limits and hopes.
Conclusion
Interpretation allows us to venture beyond the stalemate of a dispute 
about supposed facts: some of the most important political disagree-
ments are about facts-through-frames. That insight allows us to engage 
in a dialogue in the true sense of the word. While we should not expect 
agreement to arise, whether immediately or in due course, human rights 
have been ‘declarative’ from their outset.
What seems clear is that the way in which the situation is 
framed or interpreted has real consequences for the conflict itself. 
If we see disagreements between various interpretations of human rights 
as a conflict between us and them, between what is own and what is 
foreign, then this starting point will only be reiterated, so that the 
conflict can never be resolved. Reflexivity offers a more promising point 
of departure. While it does not eliminate conflict, it ceases to interpret the 
conflict in ‘bipolar’ terms. This throws a completely new light on the human 
rights discussion. In order not to prematurely ‘adjudicate’ the conflict, 
moreover, human rights themselves have to be interpreted in a way that 
is not simultaneously a show of support for any position within the 
discussion. I have offered such an interpretation by introducing the 
excentric concept of culture and an interpretation of human rights that 
is compatible with it. While human rights facilitate a common language, 
it is not the case that all discussion is thereby at an end: rather, they 
provide a framework within which the discussion can be had on equal 
moral terms.
 
29
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Julien Kloeg | Cultural Difference and Human Rights
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Jos de Mul for comments on an earlier version, to Chen 
Xin for an inspiring conversation on the topics relayed here, and to the 
editors of this journal for their insightful comments.
Julien Kloeg (1990) recently graduated from the Erasmus University Rotterdam, where 
he studied philosophy, with a thesis on the problem of dirty hands. He now teaches at 
the Erasmus University College.
‘Cultural Difference and Human Rights - A Philosophical-Anthropological Approach’ 
is an edited version of a paper that was originally written for the course ‘Philosophy of 
the Humanities: Hermeneutics in the age of digitalization, interculturalization and 
naturalization’ taught by prof. dr. Jos de Mul.
Editorial note
Since this essay was written by a member of the advisory 
board of the Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy, it was 
subject to a more extensive review procedure. For more information, see 
http://www.eur.nl/fw/english/esjp/submissions
Notes
1. Quotes from the original German include an endnote, which contains my own translation.
2. See also Angle (2002, p. 1) for a related comment by Liu Huaqui.
3. “Hermeneutics is the art of getting out of a text what is not contained in it: why else would 
we need it, if the text is there? Do we, in fact, need it? What is it, really, that one stands in 
need of, when one needs to interpret, when one needs hermeneutics: how should, how can 
hermeneutics itself be understood and interpreted?”
4. “Interpretation would be impossible if expressions were fully alien. It would be unnecessary 
if expressions contained nothing alien within them. Therefore, it is contained within these 
two extremes.”
5. “Man, set within his borders, which constrain him as a living thing, [yet] conducts his life 
beyond them. He does not only live and experience: he experiences his experience.”
6. Honneth (2000, p. 267): “Interpretationsperspektive”. Honneth uses this concept in the 
context of the crisis facing the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union: should we see 
the civil wars of the nineties as a development towards democracy or as proof that centra-
lized power is required to keep everyone in check? Honneth argues that this is a matter of 
interpretation: precisely the point I wish to make with regard to the present situation, which 
is characterized not by the disappearance of a power block (the Society Union), but by the 
emergence of one (China). 
7. This Diltheyan idea was pointed out to me by Jos de Mul.
8. It is very important to note that it is not ‘political’ in the sense of the ‘political’ conception 
of human rights, which applies to the police instead of politics in Rancière’s sense.
9. As an even more everyday aspect of Western culture, I could cite the Western way of dea-
ling with the elderly, which contrasts poorly not only to human rights standards, but also to 
Confucian-inspired convictions and practice on that issue (see Appiah, 2005, p. 264). 
10. See Hunt (2007) for a purely historical argument to the effect that the same ‘inner logic 
of rights’ described by Rancière has been a decisive normative factor since the French Revo-
lution.
11. It can be argued that Western criticism of Chinese practice reveals a double standard (see 
Peerenboom, 2005). 
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